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WHAT DO WE WANT IN A PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY? AN
ELECTION LAW PERSPECTIVE
Chad Flanders*
Although the 2008 presidential primaries were in many ways a resounding success
in terms of turnout, attention, and sheer excitement, many noted the pressing need
for reform. States were rushing to hold their primaries sooner than ever, giving rise
to “Super-Duper Tuesday,” where twenty-four states had their primaries on the
same day. The Democratic nominee at one point looked like it might be decided by
the votes of so-called “Superdelegates”—party regulars beholden to no one. As the
Democratic nomination contest wore on, Rush Limbaugh, in “Operation Chaos,”
encouraged his “dittoheads” to raid the party primaries of the Democrats, tilting
the vote against Obama, the presumptive nominee. And there were continued
grumblings about the disproportionate influence Iowa and New Hampshire had
on the whole process.
Fortunately, reform is in the air. The Democratic National Committee’s “Commission
for Change” has released its proposals for altering how the Democrats run their primaries. It is unclear how, if at all, the Republicans will follow suit. But how are we
to evaluate such proposals? What do we want in a presidential primary?
My Article, borrowing from the vital field of election law, proposes a set of values
by which we should evaluate the presidential primaries. By investigating the various players in the nomination process—voters, parties, and the state—I isolate
three major sets of “constitutional values” that are implicated in the presidential
primary system: (1) the right of voters to an effective and meaningful vote, (2) the
interests of the political parties in their autonomy and ideological purity (as well
as in electoral victory), and (3) the concern of state and federal governments that
the nomination process be legitimate, competitive, and produce a candidate who is
capable of governing.
Finally, I propose a master value—that of “deliberation”—that both explains and
unifies the various competing values at play in the primaries. And I analyze the
two major proposals for reforming the primaries, a national primary and a series
of regional primaries, as well as the recommendations of the Democratic National
Committee, in light of the goal of achieving “deliberative primaries.”

*
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Last question—and I’m not sure if you even have a sense or if it’s
even appropriate to speculate—but do you think the new rules will favor a certain type of candidate? Does it favor a candidate who surges
early like in the old Iowa and New Hampshire model, or a candidate
who is strong regionally, or a candidate with wide but not deep support across the whole country? Rules do matter . . . .1
Introduction
Few could have predicted that the 2008 Democratic primaries
would be as successful as they were. Popular participation was at an
all time high.2 People were paying attention to the candidates and
evaluating them, rather than tuning out. By nearly any measure,
3
democracy seemed to be working. Early predictions by pundits
that the Democrats would choose a candidate early and that we
were in for a long general election season were spectacularly
wrong.4 To many people’s surprise, the Democratic primaries al5
most dragged on too long.
1.
Interview by Tom Shaller with Jeff Berman, Member, Democratic Change
Commission (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/01/dcc-trying-toencourage-regional.html.
2.
John Heilemann & Mark Halperin, Game Change 262 (2010) (“The battle between Barack and Hillary had been historic across every dimension, from the amount of
money spent and the numbers of voters who had participated to its sheer closeness . . . .”);
Thomas E. Patterson, Voter Participation: Records Galore This Time, but What About Next Time?,
in Reforming the Presidential Nomination Process 44 (Steven S. Smith & Melanie J.
Springer, eds., 2009) [hereinafter Reforming] (“More than a score of state primary and
caucus turnout records were set in 2008. Overall, about 57 million Americans voted in the
2008 nominating elections, which easily eclipsed the 31 million who voted in 2000, the last
time both major parties had contested presidential races.”).
3.
Michael Neblo & Chad Flanders, The Political Process Worked—This Time, Anyway,
Milwaukee J. Sent., Apr. 27, 2008, http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/
29594264.html (“In terms of voter turnout, media attention and almost every other measure, the front-loading of the primaries seems to have caused little trouble, and the pundits’
worrying and hand-wringing seem to have been premature.”).
4.
See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Defusing Primary Primacy, Hartford Courant, Apr. 13,
2007, at A9 (“With Connecticut preparing to join California, New Jersey and roughly 20
other states in what is now being called the ‘super-duper Tuesday’ presidential primary,
America seems inexorably headed toward a national primary—not because anyone
necessarily wants one, but because states are rushing madly to be the ‘first’ to select the next
presidential nominee.”); John Nichols, Primaries Gone Wild! And How to Fix Them, The Nation, Jan. 21, 2008, at 11, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/mad-moneyprimary-race (“That front-loading means that the decisions made before the Twelve Days of
Christmas were finished began a frenzy of caucuses and primaries that, in barely a month, is
all but certain to identify the presidential nominees.”).
5.
Democratic Change Comm’n, Democratic Nat’l Comm., Report of the Democratic Change Commission 17 (2009) [hereinafter Report] (describing the process as
“too long”(quoting Don Fowler, Former Chairman, Democratic Nat’l Comm., Testimony at
Democratic Change Commission Meeting (Oct. 24, 2009))); James W. Ceaser et al., Epic
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But the fact that the predictions of disaster were mistaken for
2008 does not mean that they did not contain a great deal of truth.
In fact, America dodged a bullet. The presence of two celebrity
candidates, equally tenacious and well-funded, masked fundamen6
tal flaws in the way we nominate our presidents. It would be a
critical error to take the fluke success of the 2008 primaries as evidence that our primary system works fine and is in no need of
reform, that our primary process is headed in the right direction.7
We need to think seriously about the way we choose our presidential candidates.8 Should we keep what we have now, a de facto
national primary, which in most years would favor the most wellknown and well-funded candidate against the newcomer or the
one who has ideas, but not money? And should New Hampshire
and Iowa, states that are unrepresentative of the national interest,
still be allowed to wield a disproportionate weight in picking our
candidates simply because they refuse to take turns? Do we want an
early end to the primaries followed by a general election season
that lasts eleven months?9
Journey: The 2008 Elections and American Politics, at ix–x (2008) (“[T]he Democratic
contest turned into a marathon. Having eliminated the broader field of contenders, Hillary
Clinton and Barack Obama went head-to-head until the full schedule of contests had ended.
After threats to take the struggle to the convention, Mrs. Clinton finally conceded in the first
week of June. It was the longest active contest in modern times.”); Steven S. Smith & Melanie J. Springer, Choosing Presidential Candidates, in Reforming, supra note 2, at 13 (“The
front-loaded process did not turn out as predicted for the Democrats, for whom the contest
between Senators Clinton and Obama extended until June.”); David Greenberg, Primary
Obligations, Dissent, Summer 2008, at 35, 37 (“Particularly when his chances of winning
seemed strong, Obama seemed resentful about having to run all the way to the finish line.”);
see also Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at ix (“This [front-loading] arrangement led everyone to
predict that the nominations would be decided earlier and more quickly than ever before,
most likely by the first week in February. But fate had something else in mind.”); Gerald D.
Skoning, We Could Learn a Lot from the U.K. Election, Chi. Trib., May 14, 2010, at 23 (lamenting the length of the U.S. nomination process, as compared to the U.K.’s).
6.
See Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 254 (“Quitting . . . simply wasn’t in
the Clintons’ bloodstream.”); Evan Thomas, A Long Time Coming 53 (2009) (referring to
the extended battle between Obama and Clinton as “the long siege”); Neblo & Flanders,
supra note 3 (“The fact is that this year’s primaries were saved by celebrity: Obama’s remarkable story and the possibility of a Clinton restoration. With two Democratic superstars
running for president, what could have been a very short and early primary season was
turned into captivating drama. We should consider ourselves lucky. But we shouldn’t let this
deter us from serious thinking about the way we choose our presidential candidates.”).
7.
See Editorial, Primary Reforms, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2008, at 11 (“It takes nothing
away from the achievements of Barack Obama and John McCain to take note that the system
for choosing the parties’ nominees is seriously flawed.”).
8.
See generally James W. Ceaser, The Presidential Nomination Mess, Claremont Rev.
Books, Fall 2008, at 21.
9.
Flanders, supra note 4 (“Unless we think seriously about how we want our primaries to be run, we will end up with a system that nobody wants—a system that, as Connecticut
Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz said, benefits the rock stars and the well-funded, who
would dominate a de facto national primary.”); Neblo & Flanders, supra note 3.
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Fortunately, reform is in the air, as the Democratic Party announced proposed changes to the way it nominates its presidential
10
11
candidates. The Republican Party is sure to follow. Pundits and
academics have also chimed in, claiming the system is broken and
12
in need of reform. But how are we to evaluate such proposals for
reform? Changes in the primary system are often generated by
short-term political needs, not long-term thinking about what will
produce the best candidates. There is also the tendency for wellmeaning reformers to, in David Greenberg’s words, “act like generals fighting the last war.”13 Candidates who have won under one
14
set of primary rules will be reluctant to change them. And most
voters, if they think about the primaries at all, will tend to judge
them solely in terms of the candidates they have produced. This
will not always be a reliable indicator of whether the primary system is fundamentally sound; a good candidate might emerge from
a defective process. So it should be helpful to stop and think about
what we want in a primary system. What are the interests involved?
What values do we want to embody in the way we nominate presidential candidates?
In answering these questions, a particularly legal perspective on
the problem of primary reform may seem to offer little in the way
10.
See Report, supra note 5, at 18–19, 21; see also Editorial, Our Opinion: Presidential
Primary System Needs Revision, State-Journal Register (Springfield, Ill.), Jan. 29, 2010 (noting that the Illinois Reform Commission has recommended that the Illinois primary “be
held no earlier than June”); Jeff Zeleny, It’s Never Too Soon to Think About 2010, Caucus
Blog, (Mar. 23, 2009, 9:20 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/itsnever-to-soon-to-think-about-2012/.
11.
The Republican National Committee had discussions about the timing of various
state presidential primaries. They are still, as of this writing, wrestling with the problem of
front-loaded primaries. Florida’s early scheduling of its primaries has emerged as a problem.
See, e.g., Serafin Gomez, Florida GOP Reining Back on Primary Push, America’s Election HQ
(Mar. 15, 2011), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/03/15/florida-gop-reining-backprimary-push. The Republican National Committee has, however, approved measures that
will push back the date on which any nominee can win enough delegates to get the party’s
nomination. See Paul Bedard, New RNC Rules Mean a Longer GOP 2012 Presidential Race,
Washington Whispers (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/washingtonwhispers/2011/02/23/new-rnc-rules-mean-a-longer-gop-2012-presidential-race. This Article
will focus mostly on the Democratic Party’s primary process, both because that was where
the most dramatic changes occurred in 2008, and because the Democratic National Committee seems to be taking efforts to reform the process very seriously (and in a less ad hoc
manner).
12.
See, e.g., Thomas E. Mann, Is This Any Way to Pick a President?, in Reforming, supra
note 2, at 151; Larry J. Sabato, Picking Presidential Nominees: Time for a New Regime, in Reforming, supra note 2, at 136; Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11; Greenberg, supra
note 5, at 35.
13.
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 35.
14.
See Nichols, supra note 4, at 13 (“[A]s FairVote’s Ryan O’Donnell says, . . . ‘once an
incumbent is nominated and elected, he or she has no interest in changing the schedule.’ ”).
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of insight. The most valuable contribution election law has made
so far, one might think, is the contribution of several cogent analyses of whether and to what extent Congress has the power to
reform the presidential primary system. No doubt this is useful information, and the work of Richard Hasen and Daniel Lowenstein
is especially helpful in this regard.15 But election law can also highlight the values that are implicated in the primary system.16
Clarifying what these values are can help us think more critically
about what we want in a system for nominating our presidents, and
why our current system does not serve those values particularly
17
well.
This Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, I diagnose what
went wrong in the 2008 primaries according to the conventional
wisdom. I focus specifically on four problems that were present in
the Democratic primaries18: the front-loading of the state primary
races; the problem of party-raiding (as exemplified by Rush
Limbaugh’s “Operation Chaos”); the question of the role of socalled superdelegates; and the routine, boring, and scripted nature
of the party conventions. Part II is organized around analyzing the
three major sets of “constitutional values” that I see as implicated
in the presidential primary system: the rights of voters to an effective and meaningful vote; the interests of the political parties in
15.
See Richard L. Hasen, “Too Plain for Argument?” The Uncertain Congressional Power to
Require Parties to Choose Presidential Nominees Through Direct and Equal Primaries, 102 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 2009 (2008); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Presidential Nomination Reform: Legal Restraints and
Procedural Possibilities, in Reforming, supra note 2, at 173. For an important earlier essay on
the same topic, see William G. Mayer & Andre E. Busch, Can the Federal Government Reform the
Presidential Nomination Process?, 3 Elec. Law J. 613 (2004).
16.
In articulating these values, I rely heavily on the seminal casebook by Issacharoff,
Karlan, and Pildes. See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The
Law of Democracy (3d ed. 2007). Interestingly, however, the casebook does not have any
extended discussion of the presidential primary process. In my previous work, I have developed, in particular, the values of voter participation and deliberation. See Chad Flanders,
Deliberative Dilemmas: A Critique of Deliberation Day from the Perspective of Election Law, 23 J.L. &
Pol. 147, 150 (2007) [hereinafter Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas] (noting various places in
election law where deliberation can either be encouraged or discouraged); Chad Flanders,
How to Think About Voter Fraud (and Why), 41 Creighton L. Rev. 93, 145-49 (2007) [hereinafter Flanders, Voter Fraud] (citing voter participation as an important value in election law).
17.
In their important collection on the 2008 primaries, Steven Smith and Melanie
Springer observe that “there is no strong consensus about the key values to be reflected in
the nomination process.” Smith & Springer, supra note 5, at 18. One aim of this Article is to
help to build that consensus, by first clarifying what the values at stake are.
18.
The Republican contest did not contain nearly as many surprises. As James Ceaser
et al. write, “[s]ometimes presidential nominations turn out just the way everyone expected
at the beginning. Sometimes there are surprises. And then, on rare occasion, the surprise is
that the nomination turns out the way everyone expected at the beginning. The 2008 Republican nomination race was one of those rare occasions.” Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at
53. At the same time, one major problem—front-loading—was present in the Republican
primaries.
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their autonomy and ideological purity; and the concern of state
and federal governments that the nomination process be legitimate, competitive, and produce a candidate who is capable of
governing.
Finally, in Part III, I propose “deliberation” as the key term that
unifies the disparate constitutional values sketched out in Part II—
and evaluate various reform proposals, including the reforms proposed by the Democratic National Committee, in light of how they
foster or inhibit deliberation.
I. Problems
My burden in this Part is to sketch what went wrong in the 2008
primaries in spite of so much going right. Of course, I do not want
to gainsay that much good happened in the primaries. But it is an
open question whether those goods (increased participation, more
excitement and interest) were a product of the system or not. I
suspect that they were not. Accordingly, I want to highlight those
flaws in the system, that in future election seasons, may present
very real and very crippling problems for our democracy. That
2008 went on as well as it did despite these problems is, I surmise,
our good luck and good fortune. There may be structural flaws in
the way we select presidents, flaws that the success of 2008 did
much to hide.
A. Iowa and New Hampshire, and the Problem of Front-Loading
The most obvious problem—and the one problem that created
the most angst in pundits—was the mad rush to be the first primary.19 Traditionally, Iowa and New Hampshire have been given pride
of place as the “first primaries.”20 Along with this priority, of course,
came a disproportionate influence on whom the eventual nominee
21
would be. Although a candidate could survive a stumble in Iowa,
19.
See Report, supra note 5, at 17 (noting concerns about frontloading); Mann, supra
note 12, at 162 (describing problem of frontloading as becoming “more prominent with
each election cycle”). See generally William G. Mayer & Andrew E. Busch, The FrontLoading Problem in Presidential Nominations (2004). Mayer and Busch’s book turned
out to be prescient in predicting front-loading would be a major problem. See id. at 4–22.
20.
Sabato, supra note 12, at 142 (“A foreign observer might assume that Iowa and New
Hampshire have some constitutional mandate always to lead the primary season.”).
21.
See Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that “[s]till, some voters—
notably those in Iowa and New Hampshire—had an outsized influence, and had candidates
doting on them, while other states were afterthoughts.”)
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he or she would have to make a decent showing in New Hamp22
shire, or else their candidacy was basically toast.
The 2008 primaries kept this feature of the primaries—one
which had been heavily criticized in previous years.23 But other
states tried to take at least some of the advantage away from Iowa
and New Hampshire by moving their primaries up in the calendar
year. The difficulty was that not only one or two states did this,
many states did. As a result, Super Tuesday became Super-Duper
Tuesday.24 Candidates were facing elections in twenty-four races
(caucuses or primaries) on the same day in February.25
From a narrow perspective, Super-Duper Tuesday was the per26
fect example of a collective action problem. What would have
been rational for one state to do—jump out ahead and have more
influence on the party’s eventual nominee—became irrational
when many states did it. By all jumping out ahead, the result was
that no one state would have an “extra” impact. So front-loading, at
least from one angle, was simply counterproductive.
But this was not the type of harm that pundits focused on. Rather, they isolated three main problems with the front-loading of
the primaries. First, there was the problem that an early, national
primary would favor candidates who were already wellestablished. Those with big names and reputations—think Hillary
Clinton—would have an edge over less well-known candidates with
22.
The 2008 Edwards candidacy, although plagued by rumors of an extramarital affair, is a good example of this: after Iowa and New Hampshire, Edwards was dead as a
serious presidential candidate. See also Thomas E. Mann, in American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, The Presidential Nominating Process: Can It Be
Improved? 21 (1980) [hereinafter AEI Panel Discussion] (“Right now if candidates don’t
do well early on in the process, they drop in the polls, their money dries up, they lose media
attention, and they’re dead.”); Alan Martinson, Note, La Follette’s Folly: A Critique of Party
Associational Rights in Presidential Nomination Politics, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 185, 195
(2008) (“Indeed, the influence of the early states is emphasized by the number of candidates who drop out of the presidential nominating context after losing an early state. By the
time the later states vote, only one viable candidate may remain.”) (citation omitted).
23.
See, e.g., Cullen Murphy, Innocent Bystander: Primary Considerations, Atlantic
Monthly, Apr. 2004, at 148 (noting “hand-wringing” about “prominent roles played by
Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary”).
24.
Flanders, Defusing Primary Primacy, supra note 4 (noting that Connecticut was preparing to join roughly twenty other states in “super-duper” Tuesday for 2008 elections);
Primary Calendar: Democratic Nominating Process, N.Y. Times,
http://politics.nytimes.com/electionguide/2008/primaries/democraticprimaries/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) (noting
that more than 20 states had scheduled their contests for the earliest date allowed by the
party without special exception).
25.
Race for the White House Remains Wide Open, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
2008/POLITICS/02/06/intl.supertuesdayvote/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
26.
See, e.g., Keith Dowding, Power 31 (1996) (stating that a collective action problem occurs when individually rational self-interested decisions fail because they are not
coordinated with other actors).
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little name recognition and even smaller campaign coffers. Smaller
candidates who would need time to introduce themselves to the
American electorate would fare poorly in a one shot “national”
primary.
Second, there was the risk that an early win in the Super-Duper
primary would decisively tip the nomination in favor of one candidate, making him or her the nominee. As a result, the winner on
Super-Duper Tuesday might still be relatively unknown and unvetted before the general election campaign—think Barack Obama.27
Indeed, this was one of Hillary Clinton’s major arguments for remaining in the primaries: she would be the one to see if Barack
Obama had the mettle to survive the Republican attack machine.28
An artificially shortened primary season would give way to an artificially long general election campaign dominated by relatively
“untested” candidates. A longer primary season gives voters a
greater opportunity to inform themselves about the candidates and
to assess them in detail.29
A third worry partly relates to the primacy of Iowa and New
Hampshire, but goes beyond this. Although the place of Iowa and
New Hampshire at the front of the primary season has been attacked, it has also been thought to have the benefit of making the
candidates engage in “retail” politics before they hit the national
stage.30 Even bracketing the roles of Iowa and New Hampshire, the
more states that have their primary on one day, the less likely that a
candidate will focus his or her campaign on any one state for a prolonged period. A de facto national primary would remove this
worry by shifting the focus of the candidates from a one-state-at-atime campaign to a national campaign. Candidates would play to
their national profile without trying to gain a reputation in any one
27.
See Mayer & Busch, supra note 19, at 79 (exploring the possibility that frontloading might propel a little-known candidate to the nomination “before the public or the
press has any real opportunity to learn much about the candidate or to conduct a thorough
assessment of his of her strengths and weaknesses”).
28.
See Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 180 (“Out on the trail, Hillary was . . .
almost pleading with people not to be stampeded into voting for Obama. ‘Everybody needs
to be tested and vetted,’ she said. ‘The last thing Democrats need is to just move quickly
through this process.’ ”).
29.
See Mayer & Busch, supra note 19, at 56 (“[F]ront-loading . . . greatly accelerates
the voters’ decision process and thus makes the whole system less deliberative, less rational,
less flexible, and more chaotic.”).
30.
Austin Ranney, The Federalization of Presidential Primaries 14 (1978) (rehearsing the argument that the quality of campaigns in Iowa and New Hampshire are
superior because they emphasize “commitment, organization and personal contact” (quoting Wilson Carey McWilliams, Down with Primaries, Commonweal, July 1, 1976, at 429)).
Even granting this point, there seems no a priori reason why it should always be Iowa and
New Hampshire that get to go first.
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state. We would, in essence, have a national primary at the front
end, and then a national general election at the back end.
B. “Operation Chaos” and Party Raiding
Of course, some of the problems associated with front-loading
the primaries never materialized. The Democratic primaries did
not end with an early knockout blow. The Super-Duper primary
day, although it helped Barack Obama’s chances, did not decisively
settle the primary nomination. Hillary Clinton survived, and things
dragged on. And on. This led to its own set of problems, exclusive
to the uniquely competitive—and acrimonious—nature of the
fight.
One problem was caused not so much by Hillary Clinton as by
Rush Limbaugh, who became Clinton’s unlikely ally (at least according to him). Fearing that Obama might cruise to the
Democratic nomination relatively unbloodied, Limbaugh counseled his legion of followers to cross over and vote in the
31
Democratic primary for Hillary Clinton. By doing so, they would
mark up wins for Clinton, or at the very least delegates. Obama
would take even longer to win the nomination, which would cost
him money. In one scenario, Clinton’s continued success (aided by
Limbaugh’s “dittoheads”) would even mean that Obama would
have to pick her as vice president.32 The net result would be a
weaker Democratic slate come November.
What enabled Republicans to cross over and vote in Democratic
primaries were the phenomena of “open primaries,” set up by the
state parties or legislatures in order to encourage voter participation.33 Republicans could decide not to vote in their own primary,
which was all but over by the time Operation Chaos was
inaugurated, and instead register as a Democrat for a day. Doing so

31.
See Alec MacGillis & Peter Slevin, Did Rush Limbaugh Tilt the Vote in Indiana?, Wash.
Post, May 8, 2008, at A1 (reporting that, according to Obama campaign manager David
Plouffe, Limbaugh “had a clear factor in the outcome”); Carla Marinucci, Limbaugh Sows
Seeds of “Chaos” in Dems’ Race, S.F. Chron., Apr. 27, 2008, at A1.
32.
Rush Limbaugh, Transcript, Rush the Vote: Operation Chaos (Mar. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_031208/content/01125108.guest.html.
33.
See About the Primary—Caucus—Convention System, About.Com, http://
usgovinfo.about.com/cs/politicalsystem/a/delgateprocess.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011)
(“There are two types of primaries, closed and open. In a closed primary, voters may vote
only in the primary of the political party in which they registered. For example, a voter who
registered as a Republican can only vote in the Republican primary. In an open primary,
registered voters can vote in the primary of either party, but are allowed to vote in only one
primary.”).
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entailed no commitment to vote Democratic in the national elec34
tion.
Despite some breathless reporting by some media outlets as well
as Limbaugh himself, there is little evidence that the Limbaugh
effect was all that significant, or that it swung any states away from
35
Obama. In an election year when there were many genuine crossover voters (that is, voters who had voted Republican in previous
years, but who voted in the Democratic primary this year), the effects of Operation Chaos would have been hard to measure
anyway. Some Republican voters might have really wanted Clinton
to win the primary over Obama, and might have voted for her over
McCain in the general election.
Still, there was probably some effect, and we might view this as
one of the problems with our nominating system, even apart from
the exaggerations of Rush Limbaugh. Party nominations, we might
think, belong to the party. But when cross-over voters who have no
short or long term interest in the well-being of the party have a
role in tipping the balance in favor of one candidate or the other,
the party is harmed. We might think that this makes the process
less “pure.”
C. The Power of Superdelegates
Much of the controversy in the Democratic nomination arose
from the role of so-called “superdelegates” in picking the eventual
nominee. This was also a consequence of the drawn-out nomination fight. At the micro level, there were some hard feelings as
superdelegates switched away from early endorsements of Clinton
and decided to back Obama as he emerged as the favorite.36 At the
macro level, there were questions of why the Democratic nomination process had superdelegates at all. Certainly they were an

34.
In some cases, however, voters would have to attest that they supported the principles of the party in whose primary they were voting. See Mark Niquette, Limbaugh Safe From
Voter-Fraud Charges, Columbus Dispatch, Mar. 28, 2008, at 8A (“In Ohio, party-switchers are
supposed to sign a form attesting, under penalty of election falsification—a felony—that
they support the principles of the party whose ballot they are obtaining.”).
35.
See Todd Donovan, The Limbaugh Effect: A Rush to Judging Cross-Party Raiding in the
2008 Democratic Nomination Contests, 6 The Forum, No. 2, 2008, at 1, 5 (finding little evidence that Limbaugh influenced primaries).
36.
Georgia Congressman John Lewis was a particularly high-profile superdelegate
who switched from Clinton to Obama, although there were others. See Heilemann &
Halperin, supra note 2, at 231.
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anomaly in an age of increasing popular control of the nomination
37
process. Why were they still around?
Superdelegates in fact, were instituted as sort of a fail-safe mechanism, a peer review check on a nominee who might not fare well
in the general election or do a poor job governing38 (In the late
1970s Jimmy Carter was perceived as just such a “weak” candidate39). Superdelegates were supposed to look at the party’s
long-term interests and not merely at the short-term “likeability” of
40
a candidate. By giving the party elders (such as members of Congress, Governors, and members of the Democratic National
41
Committee ) a greater say in the process, they could ensure that a
competent and electable candidate emerged.42 Therefore, they
were to exercise their “independent judgment” in voting for a can43
didate. Superdelegates would get their votes just by virtue of the
leadership positions they held, and not be bound directly to the
popular vote in the primaries.44
Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee prior to
Barack Obama’s entrance, had early on received commitments
from many superdelegates.45 But as the race wore on and Obama
started winning more popular votes, critics questioned the role of
46
the superdelegates. Could Clinton possibly steal the election
37.
See, e.g., Paul Rockwell, Superdelegate System is Pure Elitism, San Jose Mercury News,
Apr. 3, 2008.
38.
Id. (stating that the original purpose of superdelegates was to boost influence of
party leaders so that they could screen candidates).
39.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 12 (“President
Carter’s inability to consult and build consensus would have made it impossible for him to
become his party’s leader and presidential nominee under the old nominating system
[which emphasized meeting and consulting with party regulars].”).
40.
See Ari Berman, Not So Superdelegates, The Nation, Feb. 18, 2008, at 4 (superdelegates designed to represent “establishment” interests and to discourage party outsiders from
running).
41.
See Elaine C. Kamarck, Primary Politics 158 (2009) (“The category of superdelegates was expanded in subsequent years to nearly 800 elected officials including all
members of the Democratic National Committee.”).
42.
Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at 93 (“These ‘superdelegates’ would consist mainly of
party leaders and elected officials. Though voters would continue to choose most delegates,
the superdelegates would make the nominee more accountable to party organizations and
the party in government.”)
43.
See Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Neck and Neck, Democrats Woo Superdelegates, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 10, 2008, at A1 (observing that it is a function of superdelegates to exercise
“independent judgment”).
44.
As Elaine C. Kamarck explains, superdelegates were supposed to “counter the effect of binding public primaries” and “save the party from a disastrous general election
choice.” Kamarck, supra note 41, at 155–56.
45.
Berman, supra note 40, at 6 (“The obvious beneficiary of the superdelegates this
time around is another establishment favorite, Hillary Clinton.”).
46.
See, e.g., Superdelegate System Ripe for Reform, Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Mar. 11,
2008, at 8A.
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based on the number of (super)delegates she had, even though
47
she was losing many of the popular primary contests? Fears of a
brokered convention loomed.
Eventually, the issue was resolved. Obama earned enough delegates to make a Clinton victory virtually impossible, plus
superdelegates drifted to Obama on their own.48 Obama also counseled superdelegates to vote according to the popular vote total in
49
their district or state, if delegates were elected officials. Still, the
very idea of superdelegates cut against the notion that the presidential primaries should be small-d democratic affairs and so
emerged as a problem. Why, voters asked, do we need peer review,
or wise elders to choose our presidential nominee? And if superdelegates only ratify the popular vote choice, aren’t they
redundant?50
D. Meaningless Conventions
Finally, there is a problem that has been noticeable for several
presidential campaigns, with the 2008 primaries being no exception. The nomination for each party concluded with a convention
that was scripted and entirely predictable, without any drama about
whom the party’s nominee would be. Of course, there was still
some controversy surrounding the selection of the vice presidential
candidate, at least on the Republican side. The announcement of
Alaska Governor Sarah Palin was a shock, and almost completely
unexpected by pundits.51 Her selection in turn meant that more
people tuned in to the Republican Convention to see how she
52
would perform.
47.
See Jessica Van Sack, Superdelegates May Exert Superpower, Boston Herald, Feb. 9,
2008, at 4 (demonstrating concerns that superdelegates could end up determining the nominee).
48.
Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 231.
49.
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that Obama urged superdelegates to vote
according to popular results in district, state, or nation, insofar as these favored Obama); see
Nagourney & Hulse, supra note 43, at A24 (quoting Obama on problematic role of superdelegates, and urging them to consider the judgment of the voters).
50.
See Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11 (“If superdelegates ratify the
choice made by the elected delegates, they are unnecessary. If they overrule that choice,
their influence is undemocratic.”); Greenberg, supra note 5, at 38 (noting that if superdelegates mimic the majority vote, they become “superfluous”); Berman, supra note 40, at 4
(“How could the Democratic Party be so, well, undemocratic?”).
51.
See Heilemann & Halperin, supra note 2, at 364 (“When Palin took the stage with
McCain, jaws dropped and eyes popped across the country and around the world.”).
52.
See, e.g., David Ploufe, The Audacity To Win 308 (2009) (“[G]iven [Palin’s] life
story, coupled with the surprise nature of her selection, her entrance to the race would be
nothing short of a phenomenon. I felt certain that all the oxygen in the campaign would
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But this does not take away from the main point. The conventions themselves, on the Republican side, and perhaps more so on
53
the Democratic side, were boring. Clinton did not, as she seemed
at one point capable of doing, decide to force a vote for the nomination. As a result, there was no risk of a brokered convention as
some feared (or hoped).54 This would have created some uncertainty and excitement.
Why does it matter that conventions are boring? Conventions
used to be tension-filled events, full of high-stakes bargaining,
some of it healthy and democratic, some of it made in smoky
backrooms. Forty years ago, the Democratic convention in Chicago
was the site of fervent protest, protest that could not be contained
behind fences or in carefully monitored “free speech” areas.55 Conventions, in short, used to be important. They used to matter in
selecting the candidates, and as sites of party dissent—and even
turmoil. At worst, of course, they were party bosses making backroom deals to pick the nominee or his running mate. At best, they
were places for democratic participation and contestation.
So the rise of boring conventions might be seen as problematic
relative to how conventions used to be run, or perhaps could be
run. Conventions at one point used to be points of deliberation
and decision. Now they are carefully scripted media events, “rubber stamps for registering the decisions made in primaries and
caucuses well before the conventions meet.”56 They seem to be the
very opposite of what democracy is supposed to look like.

immediately go to the newly minted McCain-Palin ticket.”); id. at 312 (calling Palin’s convention speech “much anticipated”).
53.
The boringness of the conventions may have something to do with the fact that
conventions are now mostly fund-raising affairs, and not matters of selecting candidates or
making substantive changes to the party platforms. Regular fund-raising rules do not apply
to convention donations. See Fredreka Schouten, Lobbyists’ Dollars Can Fund Political Conventions, USA Today, Jan. 29, 2007, at 6A (“Federal rules do not limit the source or amount of
convention donations.”).
54.
See Eleanor Clift, A Ticking Clock, Newsweek (Feb. 6, 2008), http://
www.newsweek.com/2008/02/05/a-ticking-clock.html (“If Hillary Clinton and Barack
Obama can’t win the requisite 2,025 delegates on their own in the upcoming primaries and
caucuses, we could be looking at a brokered convention.”).
55.
Kirkpatrick, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 5 (“The 1968 convention
did deliberate and debate a wide range of questions concerning party rules and party procedures and party positions; but that kind of convention could not happen under presentday rules.”); Norman Mailer, Miami and the Siege of Chicago (rev. ed. 2008) (providing
a narrative description of the 1968 conventions).
56.
Austin Ranney, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 14.

Flanders FTP B.doc

14

7/11/2011 10:57 AM

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 44:4

II. Values
Are the problems listed in Part I really problems? And are they
the only problems, or even the most important? In order to explain why front-loading, party-raiding, the role of superdelegates,
and boring conventions are bad (if they are bad), we need a theory that explains what values should properly be promoted by a
presidential primary. And if there are other respects in which our
primary system is less than ideal, knowing what values matter in
the process should help us identify those problems as well.
To articulate these values, I turn to the field of election law,
which for many years has been detailing and debating the role of
the Constitution in regulating the political process.57 In doing so, it
has brought to light several important values involving the interests
of voters, parties, and the state. I will call these values “constitutional values” for reasons that will I hope become clear.
A. Voters
The basic, indeed “fundamental,” value in election law is the
right to vote. It has been labeled as such in several Supreme Court
decisions.58 But as it has been developed in our constitutional
caselaw and in scholarship, it is a vote with many different aspects,
so it is important to make some distinctions. Nearly all of the various facets of the vote outlined below are implicated in the primary
process.
1. The Formal Right to Vote
59

The right to vote should be first considered in its formal aspect.
The formal right to vote is the ability to cast a ballot, and to not be
prevented from voting by, e.g., intimidating tactics or by a poll tax

57.
See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 28 (2004).
58.
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (noting the “fundamental political right” to vote); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (citing
voting as fundamental political right because it is “preservative of all rights”); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“[The] right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society.”).
59.
For an especially perceptive look at the meaning of the formal right to vote to
which I am indebted, see Joey Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Right to Vote, 86 Ind. L.J. 1289
(2011).
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or a literacy test.60 It is perhaps best described as a negative right, as
it is in most constitutional amendments regarding the right to
61
vote. It is the right not to have one’s ability to vote interfered with
or denied for arbitrary or unjustified reasons, such as wealth, race,
62
or creed.
This formal right to vote has historically been implicated in debates over the primaries. The famous (or infamous) “White
Primary” cases dealt with Texas primaries that excluded AfricanAmericans from participation in the primaries.63 At one stage in
the succession of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
Texas Democratic Party to exclude blacks: the party was, they reasoned, a private group, and the Constitution could not reach the
actions of private non-state actors.64 But this changed after the
Court’s decision in Classic v. Louisiana, which found that the pri65
mary was an integral part of the overall election process. In other
words, the primary now was state action and that made the parties
in charge of running and organizing the primaries de facto state
actors as well.66 As a result, the parties could no longer exclude voters from voting in the primaries—and not just the general
election—based on race.
The White Primary cases had special force in situations where
the primaries basically were the election: where one party so dominated the general election that the primary election was the only
contest that really mattered.67 To deny a right to vote in the primary would be effectively to deny a person’s ability to have any say in
who would eventually be elected for office (that is, who would win
the general election).
60.
Some of the greatest judicial and statutory accomplishments of the twentieth century were in service of protecting the formal right to vote. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-6 (2000) (prohibiting literacy tests); Harper, 383 U.S. at 670
(finding poll taxes unconstitutional).
61.
See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. XV, XIX (stating that the right to vote can’t be
abridged on basis of race or sex).
62.
See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668 (“Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to
one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally disfavored. To introduce wealth or
payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.” (citation omitted)).
63.
See generally Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
64.
See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1935).
65.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941).
66.
See Smith, 321 U.S. at 663–64.
67.
See Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (“The only election that has counted in this Texas county
for more than fifty years has been that held by the Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded. The Democratic primary and the general election have become no more than the
perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that has already been made in Jaybird elections . . . .”).
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This does not seem to accurately describe the present-day presidential primaries. It is simply not the case that one party or
another has a “lock” on the general election, so that to deny a person the right to vote in the Democratic or Republican primary
would be effectively to deny that person a role in the general election. Nonetheless, the formal right to vote could be relevant in
some present-day circumstances.
Some states run their primaries via a caucus system, and this may
present problems even with the formal right to vote, because people may have trouble attending the caucuses.68 They may be held at
odd times, or they may be held in houses that are not accessible to
69
the handicapped or the elderly. They may also involve a large
time investment. Furthermore, you cannot vote absentee; those
70
overseas and away will not have the right to vote. In short, the
caucus system may in fact end up preventing a large number of
people from even attending or participating in the caucus itself.71
This, we might think, amounts to a denial of the formal right to
vote as well. Barriers are being set up which stop some people from
participating.72 To be sure, these barriers may not be as severe as a
poll tax or a literacy test, but they are obstacles—obstacles that may
mean that people do not get to exercise their formal right to vote
at all.
Also, we might consider that in the 2008 contest, Democratic
voters in Michigan and Florida almost were refused representation
in the convention, because they moved up their primaries in violation of national party rules. The Democratic leadership threatened
68.
Caeser et al., supra note 5, at 97 (“In theory, caucuses fostered community and
civic deliberation. In practice they prevented participation by those who had little time to
spare.”).
69.
See Tova Andrea Wang, The Century Foundation, Issue Brief: Has America
Outgrown the Caucus? Some Thoughts on Reshaping the Nomination Contest 5
(2007), available at http://tcf.org/publications/pdfs/pb629/caucusbrief.pdf (indicating
that caucus sites may not be accessible to the handicapped and the elderly); see also Greenberg, supra note 5, at 37 (“The events’ sheer length deters the time-pressed wage earner, the
single mother, the ailing grandfather.”); Richard L. Hasen, Whatever Happened to “One Person,
One Vote”? Slate (Feb. 5, 2008, 5:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2183751/ (“Orthodox
Jews complained that they couldn’t vote in the Saturday morning Nevada caucuses.”).
70.
See Wang, supra note 69, at 4 (“There is one group of voters that is absolutely and
completely barred from participating in presidential caucuses: military and overseas voters.”); Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11 (“[P]articipants generally have to
commit themselves for hours, a sizable burden on the right to vote, especially for people
who care for children or sick relatives. There is no absentee voting, so caucuses disenfranchise voters who have conflicting work schedules; who are out of town, including in the
military; or who are too sick to travel to the caucus site.”).
71.
See id. at 2 (noting lower turnout in caucuses than in primaries).
72.
Id. at 3 (describing the many barriers voters may face in trying to participate in
caucuses).
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to throw out their primary votes, or alternatively, only seat half the
delegates elected from those states. Neither of these things hap73
pened, but they almost did, and we might think that if they did,
voters in those states would have been deprived of their right to
vote. They would have cast ballots, but those ballots would not have
counted, or not counted for as much. It would be as if they had
gone through the motions of casting a ballot, but then all, or nearly all, of their votes had been thrown out.
2. The Right to an Effective Vote
Much election law scholarship has not been especially concerned with the understanding and articulation of the formal
aspect of the right to vote. After all, such an understanding of the
right to vote is rather easy to come by. This is not to deny, of
course, that achieving the formal right for everybody to vote has
been the subject of many and important historical struggles.74 But
an increasing amount of attention in election law has been paid to
the right to an effective vote: the ability not just to cast a ballot but
also to be able to exert the same influence on an election as other
voters. The meaning of such a right has proved elusive, so that we
might be tempted to deny that the right to vote has such an aspect.
Surely everyone wants their vote to make a difference in an election, but is there a right to make a difference?
Although the idea of the right to an effective vote emerged in
the “one person, one vote” context,75 it gained a special salience in
the context of racial gerrymandering. On the one hand, AfricanAmericans that were in a majority-white district had the formal
right to vote. On the other hand, it seemed obvious that the point
of the majority-white district was to make sure that black voters had
no influence on the outcome. So long as the district was majority
white, there would never be an African-American candidate of
choice.
73.
In the Democratic primaries, Michigan and Florida were initially stripped of half
their delegates for front-loading their primary contests. See Martinson, supra note 22, at 199.
But these were restored at the Democratic National Convention. See Ceaser et al., supra
note 5, at 60; see also Richard L. Hasen, Taking the Democratic Party to Court, Slate (March 7,
2008, 11:05 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2186011/ (describing suit brought by Floridians
complaining of disenfranchisement if their delegates were not seated).
74.
Flanders, Voter Fraud, supra note 16, at 110–11 (discussing formal right to vote or
the “right to participate”).
75.
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (“Full and effective participation by
all citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in
the election of members of his state legislature.” (emphasis added)).

Flanders FTP B.doc

18

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

7/11/2011 10:57 AM

[Vol. 44:4

Whatever we think the correct remedy to this problem is, there
does appear to be a problem, and it is a problem relating to the
effectiveness of the right to vote. In the abstract, there might not
be any unfairness if your favored candidate does not win. However,
if the district has been “stacked” in such a way that your favorite
candidate never had a chance to win—and this has been deliberately orchestrated by the way district lines have been drawn—then
we might wonder if your right to vote has not, in some way, been
denied. You have not been denied the right to formally cast a vote,
perhaps. You can put your ballot in the box. But you have been
denied your right to have a role in influencing the election; the
vote you cast will not be an effective vote.
An analogous problem to the problem with majority-white districts appears in the context of the presidential primaries. If the
presidential nominee is all but determined by the Iowa caucus and
the New Hampshire primary, then those later on in the process
may feel deprived of their ability to influence the selection of the
nominee. They will have the formal right to cast a ballot, but their
vote will not matter.76 Indeed, the later a state holds its primary, the
less likely a voter in that state will have any influence on the outcome of the competition. Some have even raised the prospect that
this lack of influence, if it results in African Americans being denied an effective voice, may violate the Voting Rights Act.77 Iowa
and New Hampshire, states that do have a disproportionate influence in selecting the nominee, tend to be racially unrepresentative
of America.78
Second, the role of superdelegates may be seen as reducing the
effectiveness of one’s vote. Superdelegates qua individuals have a
much greater power to influence the selection of the eventual
nominee. Whereas a person voting in a primary will only contribute to her favored candidate’s winning some delegates, a
superdelegate on his or her own has the power to be a delegate for
a candidate. This results in a disproportionate influence on the
part of the superdelegate. This may be thought of as unfair, and a
76.
See Rob Ritchie & Paul Fidalgo, Primary Power to the People, FairVote (July 17,
2009), http://www.fairvote.org/primary-power-to-the-people (“[W]ith contests spread apart,
we always run the risk of nominations being wrapped up well before the majority of Americans have even tuned in, essentially disenfranchising them.”).
77.
See Justin Driver, Underenfranchisement: Black Voters and the Presidential Nomination
Process, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2318, 2331–32, 2339 (2004) (claiming that the primacy of Iowa
and New Hampshire could be challenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
78.
See id. at 2322–23 (“The racial homogeneity of the early-voting states, along with
their lack of a major metropolitan area, establishes a domestic agenda that often overlooks
issues that strongly affect African Americans.”). With the election of Obama, this worry may
have less force.
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denial of the ability to have an equal influence in selecting the party’s nominee.
The parties are aware of this problem. Indeed, many states in
the Democratic primaries allot delegates on a proportional basis,
that is, the person who gets the highest vote total in the state does
not win all the delegates. This way, the person who votes for the
losing candidate may still have his voice “heard” because his vote
will potentially add to the count of delegates for his or her candidate. This can be contrasted with the winner-take-all nature of the
Republican primaries, where if you are in the minority in a state,
your influence is essentially lost.79 Then again, in some Democratic
primaries, heavily Democratic districts are sometimes given more
delegates, giving voters in those districts a disproportionate influence, so a version of the unequal influence problem reemerges.80
In short, we can give the right to an effective vote some meaning, so long as we are clear about specifying the context in which
such a “right” can be asserted. Those who vote in primaries where
the nominee has already been, for all intents and purposes, chosen, may feel that their vote does not matter, because it cannot
influence the selection of the nominee. So too might voters feel
they have less influence if their state awards only a few delegates, or
if superdelegates have a greater power to choose the nominee than
they do. In all of these cases, we can give some credence to the idea
that people may unfairly lack the power to have effective influence
over their party’s nominee.
3. The Right to a Meaningful Vote
Related to the right to vote is the idea of a meaningful vote. This
notion is perhaps even more obscure than the right to an effective
vote. Surely it might be thought that the two concepts overlap, at
least because a meaningful vote would seem to have to be, at least
in part, an effective one. But here I will be using “meaningful” vote
in a sense different from having the ability to exert an influence on
the process of choosing a nominee. I will be using it to refer to the
right of voters to vote for a candidate he or she prefers.
79.
Editorial, Primary Reforms, supra note 7, at 11.
80.
Hasen, supra note 15, at 2009–10, 2010 n. 3 (“In Texas, for example, heavily Democratic districts are weighted more heavily in delegate selection than districts with more
Republicans, and about a third of the delegates are awarded through caucuses rather than
primaries. In 1988, for example, Michael Dukakis won the state with 33% of the vote in the
Texas primary compared to Jesse Jackson’s 25%, but they split Texas delegates almost evenly.”).
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We might have a hard time, initially, seeing this as a right a voter
has. If a voter does not feel that there are any candidates who adequately represent her interests, she may feel that she lacks a
meaningful choice in the primary process. But does this rise to the
status of a right? In some contexts, it may. Consider if the state puts
onerous restrictions on the rights of third party candidates, so that
few are able to run,81 or prevents a voter from writing in her favored candidate, so that she is “forced” to vote for the major two
party candidates. Justice Kennedy, for one, has said that a voter in
this situation may be deprived of a “meaningful” vote in the elec82
tion. This is because the voter may feel that she is “substantially
limited in [her] choice of candidates.”83 She might feel that her
right to vote has been diminished insofar as she has been prevented from voting for the candidate that she would prefer to vote for.
We might also look at the right to a meaningful vote as in part a
right for candidates to run for office. The individual’s right to vote
has always been bound up with the right of candidates to run for
an office; the Supreme Court has said that the two sets of rights
cannot be neatly separated.84 Individuals can have standing if their
favored candidate is excluded,85 because part of their right to vote is
bound up with having a certain candidate run. So just as a voter
may have a right to a meaningful choice of candidates, a candidate
may assert—if only through the voters—his right to be part of a
slate of candidates on the ballot.
The presidential primary will tend to limit the choice voters have
among candidates in a variety of ways. Suppose that the early primaries favor a certain type of candidate, or that a national primary
means that the field is narrowed down early on in the process.
Some who vote in later primaries may feel that they no longer have
a meaningful choice among candidates. Or perhaps the process as
a whole favors those candidates who are effective at raising money
or who already have a celebrity status. The process may make it
very difficult for those who are not well-funded or who have little
81.
See Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas, supra note 16, at 147, 155 & n.40 (discussing
ways in which election law tends to entrench the two major parties).
82.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Because
[the plaintiff] could not write in the name of a candidate he preferred, he had no way to
cast a meaningful vote.”).
83.
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1972).
84.
Id. at 143 (“[T]he rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
correlative effect on voters.”).
85.
See, e.g., Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1231, 1233 (11th Cir. 1996) (voters have
standing to sue when their favored candidate was excluded from the Republican Presidential primary).
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name recognition to run campaigns. Again, a person voting in the
primaries may feel that there is not a meaningful choice among
candidates, and so she would not have the right to cast a meaningful vote.
The caucus system also presents an example where people may
be routinely denied the opportunity to cast a meaningful vote. In
the typical caucus, a voter whose candidate does not receive a fixed
percentage of the vote in the first round of voting—usually fifteen
percent—will not be able to “vote” for that candidate in later
rounds. There will be a revote, and the person must instead vote
for one of the top vote-getters.86 Voters may have the ability to participate in discussions regarding who will be the eventual nominee
and their voice will be heard, but at a certain point they may no
longer be able to cast a vote for their candidate of choice. She can
side with a candidate, and may be vital in getting that candidate
delegates. But she will not be able to vote for the candidate that
she prefers. So while this denial may not be the denial of a formal
right to vote or the right to have an influence on the process, it
may be seen as the denial of her right to cast a “meaningful” vote.
But I should emphasize that though they are related, the right to
a meaningful vote and the right to an effective vote are distinct
concepts. The right to an effective vote refers to the influence your
vote has in the election. A diluted vote is a less effective vote because the odds of your vote making a difference are decreased;
sometimes, in the case of majority white gerrymandered districts,
the influence your vote will have in electing a candidate, if it is a
minority candidate, can shrink to zero.
A right to a meaningful vote, by comparison, implicates the diversity of the field of candidates running, and whether there is a
candidate running who matches up with your preferences, or more
generally, who you think is running on an attractive platform. Even
if your favored candidate may never win the election, having a
meaningful vote means that you get at least the chance to vote for
him or her. This is another way of saying that a right to a meaningful vote may not be a right to an effective vote. A meaningful vote is
one cast in favor of a candidate you like whether or not your vote is
effective in getting that candidate elected.

86.

Wang, supra note 69, at 1 (explaining the caucus system).
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B. Parties
A second area of value that election law has spent some time
87
identifying and specifying involves the rights of parties. The rights
of parties and the rights of voters are not easily separated—just as
the rights of voters and the rights of candidates cannot be easily
separated. Parties exist to help give voice to a group of voters, to
focus their energies in support of a particular candidate.88 Also, as
we have seen with the White Primary cases, parties also function in
a governmental capacity; they can help run elections. This is especially the case when it comes to primaries. The primaries are party
primaries; they are designed to find a candidate who can represent
the party, as well as to win in the general election.
But the interest of the party is not simply reducible to the interests of the voters, to the interests of the candidates, or to a mere
functional role. Parties have interests, and represent values in their
own right.
1. The Right to Party Autonomy
The first value associated with parties is best seen as a negative
one: it is the value to parties being left alone to experiment and do
89
what is best for their members and the party itself. This is sometimes a problematic value, as it was in the case of the White
Primaries.90 There the party could not be left alone, or else the
rights of black voters would be violated.
But apart from the White Primary cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized value in letting the party pursue its goals as
it best sees fit. In the context of primaries, that means using different methods of choosing the nominee (a primary or a caucus),
experimenting with the order of states, and allowing non-members
91
of the party to vote in the primary. The success of each different
87.
For an overview, see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1741 (1993), and Robert Wiygul, Private Rights or
Democratic Virtues? Justice Scalia and the Associational Rights of Political Parties (2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
88.
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604,
629 (1996) (describing role of parties).
89.
See, e.g.,. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976) (“[P]arty members . . . have a ‘right to organize a party in the way that will make it the most effective
political organization.’ ” (citation omitted)).
90.
See supra Part II.A.1.
91.
Greenberg, supra note 5, at 36 (“[T]he court has on the whole granted parties a
wide berth of autonomy in setting their rules. It has overturned, for instance, state laws
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experiment is not the point—the point is that the party should
have the freedom to decide how to run its own internal affairs.
Again, this is best seen as a value involving mostly what parties
should be allowed to do, not what they necessarily should be doing.
The party should not be seen merely as a tool of the state, nor
merely as a vehicle for individual voters to express their preferences. This “negative” freedom from external constraint enables
the party to further its own goals.
The goals of parties in managing their primaries are two-fold,
and sometimes conflicting. They are the goals of pursuing party
representativeness, and achieving candidate electability.92 By party
representativeness, I mean the value of having a candidate who
adequately represents the party’s values, and can be counted on as
being a standard-bearer for the party in the general election. The
goal of electability is rather straightforward. It is the goal of having
the party’s nominee be a candidate who can actually win in the
general election, and not merely be a symbolic effort to send a
“message” to those in power.
The party needs flexibility in order to decide how to prioritize
these two goals. In some cases, the party may choose to open its
primaries to voters who have not registered in the party.93 This may
be seen as putting the goal of electability in front of the goal of
party purity. The party may reason that it is better having nonmembers of the party participate in its primary because that way a
more “electable” candidate will be chosen. Of course, this decision
may also present risks: a candidate may be chosen who does not
adequately represent the party faithful. Still, the value of party autonomy says that this is a decision best left to the party.94
A further distinction should be made when it comes to party autonomy. For there are at least two levels at which party autonomy
might be a going concern: we could be talking of the autonomy of
a state party, or the autonomy of the national party. As history has
shown, the interests of the state party and the interests of the

mandating or prohibiting ‘open’ primaries, in which nonparty members are allowed to
vote.”).
92.
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Teacher’s Manual 64 (3d ed. 2008) (emphasizing “two very different models of
what parties are about: ideology and winning elections”).
93.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 208 (1986) (striking down a
statute that put “limits upon the group of registered voters whom the Party may invite to
participate” in its primaries).
94.
This is true whether the nature of the primaries is decided by the state or by the
party.
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national party do not always perfectly align.95 And in the context of
the primaries, some states have revolted against the national party
by holding their primaries on dates earlier than the national party
would allow. This resulted in sanctions for some states, but sanc96
tions that were ultimately toothless.
So when we speak of party autonomy, we should distinguish between state party autonomy and national party autonomy. The
goals of state and national parties will be similar, but will be differently inflected. Whereas a national party will want a candidate who
represents the national party’s interests, the state party will want a
candidate who best represents the demographic of the state. And
whereas both state and national parties will want a winning candidate, who they feel can win may be a source of disagreement.
2. The Right to Party Purity
We have already briefly canvassed the second value associated
with parties, and that is their “purity,” roughly understood as “ideological purity.”97 Parties are important because they represent a set
group of interests, and interests that are of the same type.98 Parties
do not merely exist to elect candidates, although that is certainly
part of their job. Parties also exist simply to represent a certain
point of view, and this point of view is not merely reducible to the
aggregate interests of its members (although there must be some
relationship between the views of the party and the views of its
members). The party, to some extent, exists in its own right, beyond what its current members believe.
Why are ideologically “pure” parties a good thing? One aspect
simply is that pure parties are best thought to represent the party
faithful. To this extent, the party is a vehicle of its members, especially the members that are most vested in the party and furthering
its message. But the party also is its message, and it might be
thought to be a good thing that its message is as clear as possible,
95.
See, e.g., Democratic Party of the U.S. v. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 107–12 (1981)
(responding to a clash between national Democratic party and state party about whether the
national party had to accept results of a primary).
96.
The Republican party ended up stripping several states of half of their delegates
because they held early contests, but this ended up mattering little to the outcome of the
contest. For the results of the Democratic sanctions, see supra note 73.
97.
See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (acknowledging special First Amendment protection for the “process by which a political party ‘select[s] a
standard bearer who best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences’ ” (citation omitted)).
98.
See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S.
604, 629 (1996) (“[Parties] . . . exist to advance their members’ shared political beliefs.”).
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and that it represents an ideologically distinct way of looking at the
99
world. Parties at least purport to give a consistent philosophy of
governing. The more parties are concerned solely with winning,
the less they may be able to project this philosophy of governing.
Party purity is valuable just insofar as having candidates who are
able to articulate and defend a consistent philosophy are appealing. There is also a related, pragmatic interest in having parties
with clear messages: it enables more informed choices by voters
because they can “rel[y] on party labels as representative of certain
ideologies[.]”100
The drive for ideological purity in parties may lead in some in101
stances to the need to protect parties from themselves. Parties
may be tempted by the prospect of victory—or the frustration of
continually losing—to broaden their appeal and accordingly dilute
their message. But this may be thought to defeat the purpose of
having the party in the first place. If the party is simply a way to get
someone who would win, then why have an ideologically distinct
party at all? Why have party platforms? When we start focusing
more on a party’s ability to elect a candidate, and less on its ability
to form and promote a distinct message, we start losing the point
of having parties at all. This suggests that party purity, more than
party autonomy, is the main value that should be associated with
parties.
We might view the role of superdelegates as serving the interests
of the party’s purity. Superdelegates, the theory goes, are less interested in the short-term interest of the party in producing a
popular candidate who can win.102 They are interested, instead, in
the party producing a candidate who can faithfully represent the
party’s interest in the general election and then—just as importantly—who can govern effectively and put the party’s platform into
law and policy. The superdelegates will want, then, a candidate who
is accountable to the party, and not merely to the people. Or to put
this in a less tendentious way, they will want a candidate who is
99.
See id. at 615 (“A political party’s independent expression . . . reflects its members’
views about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together . . . .”).
100. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976).
101. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 237 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the State may have the right to “protect the Party against the Party
itself” in the interests of retaining party purity).
102. Although this is not to say that this might also be a concern of theirs. The point is,
it is not the only concern, or even the most important. Bruce Ackerman has recently emphasized the moderating function of superdelegates. See Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and
Fall of the American Republic 17 (2010) (“When party chieftains did the picking, they
focused on candidates who might win the support of the median voter in their state.” (citation omitted)).
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faithful to the party’s vision, and not merely to the transient interests of voters in the general election. Of course, they will want a
candidate who will win. But, at least in principle, they should not
be willing to back a candidate who wants to win at all costs—
including the cost of diluting or dirtying the party’s message.
C. The State
Finally, we come to the interests of the state in the primary process. Much in the same way that a party’s interest will overlap with
the interests of the voters that make up the party, so too will the
state be interested in protecting the rights of voters and parties.
The state will want to enforce at least the individual voters’ formal
right to vote, and perhaps also take measures (such as the Voting
Rights Act and amendments to it) to ensure that voters have an
effective right to vote. It will want to protect the autonomy of parties and it is also the case that voters and parties will have shared
interests with the state.
The state will always have a generic interest in protecting the
rights of individuals and entities under its care—or at least it
should have such an interest. The state, for instance, has an interest in protecting prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment or
in preserving the Second Amendment rights of gun owners. But
what I want to discuss here is how the state has special electionrelated interests in protecting the rights of citizens and parties.
These interests will go beyond merely protecting the right to vote
of citizens or the autonomy of parties, although it will obviously
include them.
1. Legitimacy
The first and most important interest of the state in elections is
to ensure election results that are accepted as legitimate by citizens.103 If voters are prevented from voting by intimidation, or if
there is widespread voter fraud, the state may be concerned that
103. This is also sometimes phrased as protecting the overall “integrity” of the election
process. See, e.g., Nader, 417 F. Supp. at 845 (“In addition to protecting the associational
rights of party members, a state has a more general, but equally legitimate, interest in protecting the overall integrity of the historic electoral process.”). See also Mann, in AEI Panel
Discussion, supra note 22, at 2 (“The process has to be legitimate; it has to be perceived as
fair, as proper, as appropriate by citizens and by leaders. If they have no confidence in the
system, it becomes illegitimate, and that in turn works to undermine the system.”).
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the election results are not valid.104 The winner of the election may
105
not correspond to the candidate the voters actually chose. This
will make it less likely that the winner will be accepted as legitimate, creating a serious problem for the state.
Or consider another example taken from the campaign finance
context. The state may have an interest in preventing the impression that votes can be bought, or that wealthy donors have a
greater role in the selection process than non-wealthy voters.106 If
people think the election is corrupt in either of these ways, they
may not accept the winning candidate as legitimately elected. They
will think that the way the election was decided was not by the attractiveness of the candidate’s message or by his skills as a
campaigner, but only because he was able to outspend his opponent. In the Supreme Court caselaw, anti-corruption is a value
closely linked to legitimacy, if not one that is precisely identical to
it.107
Legitimacy is a hard value to define precisely. It can have a normative meaning, but it can also have a descriptive one. Here I am
mostly interested in descriptive legitimacy.108 The state has an interest in having an election that citizens will accept as producing a
winner who is legitimate—even if, perhaps, they should not accept
that result. This allows the state considerable leeway in tolerating
some practices that might not be ideal in selecting candidates who
can govern well, or who adequately represent the interests of citizens.

104. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620 (2008) (noting
state interests in preventing voter fraud and thereby protecting public confidence in the
“integrity and legitimacy of representative government”); Center for Democracy and
Election Management, Building Confidence in U.S. Elections: Report of the Commission on Federal Election Reform 18 (2005), available at http://www1.american.edu/
ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf (“The electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if
no safeguards exist to deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.”).
105. Flanders, Voter Fraud, supra note 16, at 122 (describing cases of “massive fraud”
where candidate with most legitimate votes may not have won).
106. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“[R]estrictions upon the amount any one individual can contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process—the means through which a free
society democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action.”); Andrew N. DeLaney, Note, Appearance Matters: Why the State has an Interest in Preventing the
Appearance of Voting Fraud, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 847, 860 (2008).
107. See Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1036, 1036–87 (2005) (analyzing Supreme Court campaign
finance decisions and their use of the idea of corruption).
108. See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 19 (2006) (explaining legitimacy
as in part whether people generally accept the decisions and policies of legal decisionmakers).
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My emphasis on descriptive legitimacy might make it harder to
characterize the preference given to New Hampshire and Iowa as
illegitimate. The priority given to those states may result in candidates who do not fairly represent the interests of most members of
the Democratic Party. But it is hard to say that the primacy given to
these states renders the selection of the Democratic nominee illegitimate. And indeed, most people do not see the preference given to
New Hampshire and Iowa as rendering the system illegitimate.
They may not like it,109 but they do not think that it taints the eventual nominee, so that if he wins the primary based on the
momentum he has coming out of Iowa and New Hampshire, he is
not “legitimately” the winner. This of course could change.
By contrast, in several cases the Court has recognized a state interest in preventing party raiding, based on preserving the
“integrity” of the electoral process.110 This may entail limiting the
right of parties to invite whomever they want to participate in their
primary process. If the rules for letting non-party members vote are
too lax, and so subject to abuse,111 the voters may end up selecting a
candidate that most members of the party would not accept as legitimate.
2. Competition
A state interest which has been recently examined with some
subtlety by election law scholars is the state’s interest in competitive
112
races. It may be hard to see this as truly a distinct interest the
state has, but a little digging shows why competition is a value in
election law. On the one hand, a competitive election might be
thought to be a more legitimate election. In a competitive election,
candidates are tested, and voters get a good chance to evaluate the
merits and failings of each of the individual candidates. Moreover,
if an election is dominated by a candidate who is well-financed,
voters may think he has won the election less due to his qualifica109. Although this is unclear. See Melanie J. Springer & James Gibson, Public Opinion
and Presidential Nominating Systems, in Reforming, supra note 2, at 123 (indicating that less
than 50% of those polled favored a system where New Hampshire is not first).
110. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986) (noting the
state’s legitimate interest in preventing party raiding in order to protect “integrity of the
electoral process”); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1986) (citing
state interest in preserving stability). See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization
of Democratic Politics, in A Badly Flawed Election: Debating Bush v. Gore, the Supreme
Court, and American Democracy 155, 165, 182 (2002).
111. As perhaps happened in “Operation Chaos.” But see Niquette, supra note 34, at 8A.
112. Richard Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, in The Vote 140, 155 (2001) (explaining
value of “robust competition” in election law).
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tions than to his ability to outspend the other candidates. So this
may also influence whether the candidate is perceived as “legitimate” or not.
On the other hand, and to anticipate the value we will be considering next, a competitive election may be a way of testing to see
if the candidate will be effective at governing, if she is elected.
Campaigns, both in the primary and in the general election, are
thought to test the same virtues as governing does: building coalitions, weathering opposition, etc. A competitive election is one
that gives candidates the ability to show that they have the skills
necessary to govern effectively. A more wide-open race also increases the chance that a candidate who is cash-poor or lacks name
recognition, but is the better candidate, may win her party’s primary.
Is there, then, an independent value to competition? Yes. Competitive elections form a valuable civic function. They engage more
voter interest and participation—this increases the likelihood of a
legitimate election, of course, but it is also an independent good.
So too is it the case that more informed voters may choose a candidate who is better at governing. But it is also good that citizens
are more aware of who the candidates are. Competitive elections
increase civic participation because of the interest they generate:
citizens discuss and debate the merits of the candidates in ways in
which they might not if one candidate has a “lock” on the nomination, and the primary is a foregone conclusion. This is obvious
from the 2008 primary.113
Competition as an independent good may not have that great of
a value, however. It may not create an incentive for the state to
make an election competitive just for the sake of making elections
more competitive. Moreover, the state also has an interest in having a stable election.114 This is closely related to its interest in
having an election that is legitimate. An election that is too competitive, where there are too many candidates, and where no
candidate can get the support of a majority of his party’s voters,
may drag on too long and create uncertainty. The state may then
have an interest in decreasing the extent to which races are “wideopen,” because in the end what the state wants is the election of a
candidate who can govern, not a never-ending civics seminar.

113. See supra note 2 (describing record interest and participation in 2008 primary).
114. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 512 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stressing value of
democratic stability); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter,
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if
some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”).
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Some might conclude that the 2008 Democratic primary was too
fiercely competitive in precisely this way. The Clinton-Obama race,
although it excited massive popular interest and participation,
risked going on too long and becoming too divisive. The worry was
that the primary would end not just with a battle-tested candidate,
but also one who was bloodied and poorly prepared for the general election. This did not happen, of course. But the specter was
raised, and may show the limit of the good of competitive elections.
3. Governance
Finally, the state has an important interest in making sure that
the candidate who is selected by the party can eventually govern
well.115 That is, the candidate must be able to do the job she might
be elected to do effectively. This is an interest arguably as great as
the interest in having a legitimate candidate. If a candidate wins
the acceptance of the people as legitimate, it may still be a disaster
for the country if the candidate cannot govern well.
As already discussed, competitive elections can be one way of
making sure that a candidate will govern well. A successful candidate in an election might be thought to have many of the traits that
make for a successful office-holder.116 The candidate must be able
to persuade, to organize, and to rally. A president must also have
these virtues—indeed; the office of the presidency has frequently
been called a “permanent campaign.”117
A candidate for president must also be able to work with and—
hopefully—win the endorsement of the members of the party if he
is able to win the nomination.118 This may also be seen as an important test of whether the candidate will govern well. Here the
interests of the state and the party may converge. One reason for
instituting superdelegates was the concern of Democrats to make
115. See Howard R. Penniman, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 4 (“The debates in the framing of the Constitution show that every element of the electoral system was
designed deliberately with an eye toward producing good presidents . . . . A good presidential selection process required a representative system involving deliberation among people
who knew the candidates and could make judgments about the candidates’ abilities.”).
116. But cf. id. at 11 (“[T]he skills required to be successful in the nominating process
are almost entirely irrelevant to, perhaps even negatively correlated with, the skills required
to be successful at governing.”).
117. See generally Sidney Blumenthal, The Permanent Campaign (1982) (detailing
the many ways the position of president represents a permanent campaign).
118. See Mann, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 6 (stressing importance of
“bring[ing] candidates in touch with people who subsequently share in governing” in the
primaries).
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sure a Democratic candidate would have to meet and work with the
higher-ups of the party. They could measure his ability to govern,
and one aspect of testing that was whether he could negotiate and
work with them in the context of a competitive election.
Finally, the act of choosing a vice president is often thought to
be a measure of the candidate’s ability to govern. It is typically
thought to be the candidate’s “first” major choice of governance:
who will he or she select to govern with? What does that decision
show about the candidate’s ability to make difficult choices? There
was widespread perception that John McCain’s choice of Sarah Palin as his running mate showed that he just wanted to win, that he
was not being serious about the office of the presidency.119
It is unclear what, in general, the state can do to ensure that a
candidate will be able to govern well. Of course, the state can require certain things of candidates: that they be of a certain age, or
be citizens. There are a few things we can say about the type of
process the state would tend to resist, however, if it were interested
in governance as a value. It may want to resist a system that gives
the nomination to a candidate who is relatively untested and who
wins mainly because of an advantage in fund-raising or celebrity
status.120 The state may also want to foster strong parties, as entities
that can hold candidates accountable, and be held accountable
themselves.121 But regardless of how the state can secure this interest, it seems indisputable that it does indeed have this interest.
III. Toward Deliberative Primaries
In the previous Part, I laid out various interests that election law
scholars have identified as “at play” in their field. I also took pains
to show how those interests are implicated in current controversies
119. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, The Reason for All of This, The Daily Dish (Nov. 17, 2009,
2:58 PM), http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/11/the-institute-forthe-study-of-sarah-palin.html (stating that McCain’s pick of Sarah Palin showed John
McCain’s “recklessness and cynicism”).
120. James Ceaser, The Presidential Nomination Mess, 8 Claremont Rev. Books, Fall
2008, at 21, 25 (“But two nominees now seem to be clear ‘products’ of the new system: Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama. Neither won on the basis of a substantial record of public
service or high previous standing in his party. Their victories were due to their performance
as popular leaders.”).
121. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604,
615 (1996) (“A political party’s independent expression not only reflects its members’ views
about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to
convince others to join those members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating a
government that voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or failure.”).
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about election law. It should be obvious by now that the interests
are not unique to any one player in the field. Voters will of course
have an interest in a legitimate election. How could they not? They
will also want a candidate that will be able to govern once elected.
Voters who are members of a party may have an interest in keeping
that party ideologically pure, or at least in giving it the ability to
regulate its internal affairs as will best suit the party. And candidates—a group I didn’t specifically single out in Part II—certainly
have an interest in voters being able to vote, an interest in parties
that can be able to support them, and an interest in a campaign
process which tests them, yet is fair. So by listing the interests separately, I did not mean, by any stretch, to say that the interests are
exclusive to any one player. Indeed, the interests overlap and,
because they are interests of many groups, tend to reinforce one
another.
But in this Part I want to introduce another constitutional value,
one that I think in some sense consolidates many of the interests
and values identified in the previous section. That interest is in deliberation. Deliberation is not so much an outcome value as a
process value: it is less about securing a good result as about making sure that result is reached in a certain way, that is, through
discussion and debate. Then again, many of the values identified in
the previous Part were process values: the ability to participate and
have your voice heard, the interest in having a competitive election, or a legitimate one—these are all values about ensuring a
good process, not necessarily a good outcome. But I want to argue
that by looking at deliberation as a value, and perhaps the chief
value of the primaries, we can unite many of the various values
from the previous Part and give them a center.122
I begin this part by sketching the value of deliberation in elections, and contrasting it with another view of election law that sees
elections mostly as devices to aggregate and measure interests. I
then go on to evaluate two major proposals for reforming the primaries—a series of regional primaries and a national primary—in
light of both of the various values listed in Part II, and also the value of deliberation. I contend that a series of regional primaries
best fulfills both the values of Part II and the meta-value of deliberation. National primaries, though often seen as an improvement
over the present system and although they seemingly aid some of
the election law values of Part II, are the inferior option. I close

122. On the rise of deliberation as a value in American campaigns, see generally John
Gardner, What Are Campaigns For? ch. 1 (2009).
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this Part by briefly considering the reform proposals made by the
Democratic Change Commission in its recent Report.
A. Deliberation vs. Aggregation
The value of deliberation has often appeared in the Supreme
123
Court’s decisions on campaign finance, although I think we can
divorce it from that context here and consider it as an independent value on its own.124 The rough idea behind it is that in a
democracy, the goal is not simply a good outcome. That is, the value of a campaign is not just in electing the best candidate,
although that is important. There is a value in having a robust debate about the candidates and about the issues, about having
people think about the candidates and possibly change their
minds. There is a value, further, in discussion between citizens, between candidates, and between citizens and candidates. All of these
process values are goods in themselves, something that campaigns
and elections can facilitate.
What are the characteristics of such democratic deliberation, at
least ideally? For present purposes, we can highlight two. The first
is that there should be a variety of points of view, so we should try
to secure as much participation as we can, and hear as many different kinds of voices as we can.125 In the campaign finance context,
this is understandably put in terms of restricting the monopoliza126
tion of debate by the wealthy. If the rich are able to give
123. This concern got its classic expression in the now-overruled Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), where Justice Marshall warned of the “corrosive and distorting effects” large contributions from corporations could have on the quality of political
debate.
124. Many have found the value of deliberation to be implicit in the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 46 (2005) (understanding the First Amendment’s function “as seeking to facilitate a conversation among ordinary citizens that will
encourage their informed participation in the electoral process”); see also Owen M. Fiss,
The Irony of Free Speech 19 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, Liberalism Divided: Freedom of
Speech and the Many Uses of State Power 67–88 (1996).
125. See Gardner, supra note 122, at 136 (“In most theories, processes of deliberation
must be inclusive so that deliberators may consider the greatest variety of viewpoints, a practice said both to improve the quality of decision making and to ensure that all who will be
bound by democratic decisions have a voice in making them.” (footnote omitted)). Gardner, I should note, has significant reservations about the value of deliberation in electoral
politics.
126. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (denouncing “the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
ideas”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (“According to

Flanders FTP B.doc

34

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

7/11/2011 10:57 AM

[Vol. 44:4

unlimited sums to candidates, the reasoning goes, only the candidates they favor will be heard. Those who are able only to give
modest sums or no money at all, will not be able to have their candidates heard. In the familiar metaphor, the megaphone of the
127
rich will drown out the voices of the poor. And the more people
who can be heard, the argument continues, the better the debate
will be. Not only will it be more representative, the conclusions
reached will likely be better for having considered a wide range of
viewpoints.128
Second, deliberation holds out the promise that debate will not
merely reinforce people’s views on a particular position—that they
will leave the process with the same views that they entered in
with—but that it might transform them.129 By hearing all sides of
the debate and by engaging with them, one might leave a discussion with one’s position changed. Perhaps this means that you hold
your initial position with much less certainty, you modify it slightly,
or you repudiate it all together. None of these options are required
by deliberation, but deliberation holds open the possibility that one or
all of these things could happen, and this is seen as a good thing in
itself.
Deliberation as a value is usefully contrasted with a view of elections that sees them merely as aggregating pre-existing
preferences.130 If elections merely exist to tabulate and tally what
appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views may drown out other points
of view.”).
127. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000) (No. 98-963), 1999 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 76 (“A big megaphone can drown out the
smaller ones, and if Missouri wants the smaller ones also to have a voice, maybe it has to
limit the size of the larger one, and if that’s so, isn’t that just as important a constitutional
interest as the First Amendment interest of Ebenezer Scrooge?”).
128. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 200 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The minor party’s often unconventional positions broaden political debate, expand
the range of issues with which the electorate is concerned, and influence the positions of the
majority, in some instances ultimately becoming majority positions.”). See generally Gardner,
supra note 122, at 48–49. The locus classicus for this point is J.S. Mill’s On Liberty. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 42–43 (Ticknor & Fields 1863) (1859) (comparing a position with
those of others is the best way of testing it).
129. Dennis F. Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in
the United States 195 (2002) (“As deliberators, citizens modify their views in response to
the views voiced by others. When citizens vote, they simply record their own conclusions.
They do not change them in response to anyone.”).
130. Id. at 202 n.20 (noting that deliberative theory “is often contrasted with aggregative theory, which requires only that citizens or their representatives express individual
preferences. Aggregative theory typically relies on voting to turn theses individual preferences into collective outcomes . . . .”); see also Gardner, supra note 122, at 136
(“[D]eliberative theories understand preferences to be formed endogenously, in the cruicible of politics itself, through the give and take of discussion with other citizens of different
views.”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution ch. 6 (1993).
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people think already, deliberation is at best useless and at worst a
distraction. Why have many points of view if the goal is just to add
up preferences? Why have a process that might encourage people
to change their preferences? Such a process could be profoundly
destabilizing and disorienting. It would make it harder for elections to unambiguously register the opinions and the preferences
of the voters. On the aggregation picture there is no independent
value to having people deliberate at length, or even at all. It may at
best serve the secondary function of making sure that the preferences people vote are their “true” preferences, ones that are not
likely to change.
Deliberation as a value captures many of the values that were articulated and laid out in Part II of this Article. It also transforms
and unifies them, and helps us see how they contribute to an underlying vision of deliberative primaries. The right to vote, on the
deliberative picture, is no longer a merely formal value. That is, it is
not merely about the right to be heard, although this is important.
It is the right, more fundamentally, to participate in the process
along with others. It now can be seen as having a positive value,
and not merely a negative one (to be free from obstacles to voting). Your formal right to vote also indicates your right to engage
in the ongoing debate that is the primary election season, and to
have your voice counted in the end. It is your ticket to the deliberative process.131
So too might we see the idea of having a meaningful and effective vote as necessary to ensure that diverse voices are represented
in the debate. The process should not be confined just to one
segment of the population, but should give all types of people the
opportunity to influence and contribute to the debate. Iowa and
New Hampshire should not be allowed to drown out the voices of
the other states. Nor should the primary process unfairly burden
or exclude the voices of those not from the two major parties.
The value of party autonomy and independence can also be
viewed through this lens. Having parties that represent distinct
viewpoints can add to deliberation by clarifying the options voters
have, and by presenting a consistent and coherent governing philosophy. They can be the starting points for voters to think about
the merits of the candidates who seek to be the party’s representative. Even party autonomy might aid deliberation—if parties feel
that the party is getting too isolated or out of touch, they may seek
the input of those from outside the parties. Either way, parties can
131. At the same time, as I emphasize in the conclusion, there are many ways that one
can engage in the deliberative process that do not end with casting a ballot.

Flanders FTP B.doc

36

7/11/2011 10:57 AM

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 44:4

be seen as vital to deliberation, and so deserving of extra protection.
Finally, deliberation enhances and preserves the state’s interests
as well. It seems plausible that a candidate who has been selected
after deliberation is a more “legitimate” candidate than one who
has just been selected by a popular vote with no deliberation. Deliberation implies that we not only know the candidate’s views, but
have also thought about them, and found them to be persuasive—
or at least better than the alternative. We are not just registering
our gut feelings, which we may later come to regret.
Deliberation also reveals the state’s interest in competition and
puts it in a clearer light. Competitive elections are more likely to
involve considering and debating the differences between candidates. If one candidate has a lock on the primary, there is little
incentive to do so: why bother deliberating, if such deliberation
will be useless? And a candidate who has to engage with many
points of view may be thought to be better at governing.
So I conclude that at as a value, deliberation has much in favor
of it. It is an important value in its own right, and it also helps us to
understand how the values of individual voters, parties, and the
state may be unified. Deliberation works, when it works, to the advantage of all concerned. But how can we get deliberation to work?
B. A National Primary
For decades, a favorite proposal of reformers has been a national primary system: have all of the states hold their primaries on the
same day.132 This proposal has several advantages, which we can see
by referring to the constitutional values of Part II. Perhaps its
greatest virtue comes with the right to vote, considered in its many
guises. A national primary, presumably, would eliminate the caucus
system, and allow each registered voter to cast a vote on National
Primary day. So too would it, presumably, eliminate the advantage
that Iowa and New Hampshire currently have (although one could
imagine a modified national primary that would retain the traditional early status of those two states). If all states had their
primaries on the same day, every state, and every voter could in
principle be the “deciding” vote of the primary election. There
132. See, e.g., Thomas Gangale, From the Primaries to the Polls: How to Repair
America’s Broken Presidential Nomination Process 95–97 (2008) (comparing the
author’s favored “American Plan” with a national primary); Ranney, supra note 30, at 7–8
(discussion and analysis of various proposals for a national primary day, “not only the oldest
reform proposal . . . but also the most frequent”).
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would no longer be an advantage to states that held their primaries
earlier and got to play a potentially pivotal role in selecting the
nominee. Every vote, it seems, would have an equal chance of being effective. This is not something to take lightly, and indeed is
the principal advantage of a national primary. Moreover, it is intuitively plausible that a national primary would increase interest and
increase turnout. It terms of getting the most participation from
ordinary people, the national primary scores high.133
There are other advantages. From the perspective of the political parties, they may see it as in their interest to have a candidate
who—even at the primary stage—has shown definite and genuine
“national” appeal and who could therefore make a strong showing
in the general election. And presumably a candidate who was able
to win a majority of the votes on national primary day may seen by
the voters to be more legitimate. He or she would not merely be a
“favorite son” or “favorite daughter” of a particular state or a particular region, but someone whom the nation saw as real
presidential material.
But there are some obvious drawbacks to the proposal as well.
Let me first view them through some of the values in Part II, and
then consider the national primary in light of the value of deliberation.
For starters, the national primary might be thought to make it
difficult for less well-known candidates to win.134 They will not have
the name recognition to capture many votes nationally, and they
will not have the money to run a national campaign. This is bad for
the value of a meaningful vote. The fewer “smaller” candidates who
are able to run an effective campaign, the less choice voters will
have come primary time. Moreover, a national primary may not be
a very competitive race, if a well-funded and well-known candidate
is able to take an early lead and sprint ahead of the field. He or she
will able to sew up the nomination rather quickly—indeed, after
the national primary is held, the race will be over.
If we restricted ourselves to only these values—the values in Part
II—we might think that the balance tips in favor of a national primary. After all, it does a better job at securing an equal right to
vote, and ensures a “national” candidate, and participation would
doubtless increase. But things look different after we consider the
value of deliberation. The national primary is a perfect example of
133. It is also popular. See Springer & Gibson, supra note 109, at 109, 123; Ritchie & Fidalgo, supra note 76 (reporting that 72% of Americans favor a single national primary).
134. Ranney, supra note 30, at 19 (“[A] one-day national direct primary probably could
be won only by a contender already well known and well financed.”).
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a system tailored toward an aggregative model of politics: we have
our fixed preferences, and we vote, and then the candidate with
the most votes wins. There is no need to drag out the process.
However, if we look at things in terms of deliberation, the national primary appears as something close to a disaster. It favors
mainstream candidates who already have wide appeal and name
recognition. Crowding out third party candidates may hinder the
right to a meaningful vote; but that crowding out is also salient because it means that there are fewer voices in the conversation.
These voices matter, not only because someone may want to vote
for the “marginal candidate,” but also because the “marginal candidate” can bring new perspectives to the table, and force the
mainstream candidate to consider that perspective—and perhaps
alter his or her own position in light of it.
The variety of perspectives is also relevant if we consider the
states as having primaries at different times as opposed to having
one day when the primary takes place. A one-day primary in all fifty
states is a national primary. It is not fifty separate primaries. But
when you spread out the primaries and across different states and
different regions at different times, more issues become salient. In
particular, regional issues become salient. A national primary would
have to be about major national issues. Regional and state primaries, however, would be more about local issues; candidates who
hope to win in a state or regional primary would have to pay attention to those issues.
Moreover, deliberation—unlike aggregation—takes time. It is a
process that cannot be done in a day (even a day of deliberation135). That is why if we had only one day to vote and to decide
the nominee, this would be a disaster for deliberation. Deliberation presupposes the possibility and the actuality that people will
change their preferences or at least better inform their preferences if they are given information and time to think about that
136
information. If the primary is just a one shot affair, then the
possibility of meaningful deliberation is foreclosed, or at least
strongly curtailed, from the start.
This is why the 2008 primaries were not a good test of the idea
of a national primary. Many pundits talked about (and feared) a
135. See Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas, supra note 16, at 164 (discussing the proposal by
Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin for a national “deliberation day”). Moreover, longer
primaries mean different candidates will fare better at different times; the race will not
quickly be between the Democratic and the Republican nominees, but between many Democratic and many Republican nominees. This can only be a boon to deliberation.
136. Cf. Kirkpatrick, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 24 (emphasizing the
value of “prolonging the decision process”).
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“de facto” national primary, when over half of the states held their
primary on the same day. But it was not a true national primary.
The presidential candidate for the Democratic Party was not chosen on that day, and indeed the race dragged on for several more
months. It was precisely because we did not have a true national
primary that the race was as successful as it was. There was competition between two high profile and extremely able candidates.
There was deliberation, because there was time for people to reflect and consider the differences between the two candidates.137
C. Regional Primaries
The other major reform proposal is a system of regional prima138
ries. The details between competing plans will differ, but the
basic idea is as follows. States will be grouped along regional lines,
reflecting both geography and interests. The regional primaries
would then be spread apart by a couple of weeks, and held
throughout the primary season. Some plans have the smaller states
going first. Some would have the first region to hold a contest be
chosen randomly. Still other plans favor having regions each go
first on a rotating basis. And once more, as with a national primary,
we can imagine a system that would leave the traditional “first
state” status with Iowa and New Hampshire and then have a regional primary with the remaining states.
As opposed to the national primary, the disadvantages of the regional primary with regard to having an effective vote seem to
stand out. Those states in the region that goes first will still have an
advantage in choosing the nominee. Invariably, the candidate who
picks up the first region will have momentum going into the next
137. But is the problem merely with a national primary, or with having a national primary very early in the primary season? Both. An early national primary cuts shorts debate
before most people are paying attention. But even a later national primary would not be
ideal. By spreading the contests out, there is a greater chance to sustain voter interest and
participation for several months. Having one national primary late in the primary season
might make for intense debate for a few weeks before the national primary, but not much
more.
138. See Martinson, supra note 22, at 200 (explaining how “the [‘California Plan’] randomly generates a primary calendar, while ensuring that the schedule is spread out over ten,
two-week intervals, and allowing for fewer delegates to be selected in the first few weeks so as
to guarantee retail politicking”); Nichols, supra note 4, at 14 (describing the “Delaware Plan”
where “the smallest twelve states would have chosen delegates in March, the next smallest
fourteen in April, the next thirteen in May and the remainder in June”); The American Plan,
Fix the Primaries, http://www.fixtheprimaries.com/solutions/americanplan/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2011) (describing a system which “features a schedule consisting of ten intervals,
generally of two weeks, during which randomly selected states may hold their primaries”).
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set of contests. Those who are in the later regions, and especially
those in the last region to have its primaries, may feel that their
voice is not being heard.
This is a serious worry. At the same time, it can be overstated.
Some candidates will have regional advantages—they may be Senators or Governors in state with later primaries—and may be able to
make a strong showing late in the primary season, even after getting off to a poor or rocky start. Moreover, there is a chance that
the campaign will start in a region in which no candidate has a decisive advantage, so that even after the first primary day, there is
still a relatively open contest. Finally, if the regions take turns going
first, the unfairness of one primary season could be mitigated in
the next.
But whatever unfairness lingers seems to be made up by the advantages of the regional primary system in terms of the goal of
deliberation. By breaking up the contest and spreading it out over
time, one reduces the risk that a celebrity candidate can simply
dominate the first set of primaries and make the remaining primaries irrelevant. It also gives various regional stars a chance to shine
later in the primary season, when their state or region comes to
vote. They may at least have a chance to shine, even if they cannot
translate their regional celebrity into a national candidacy. Or a
lesser-known candidate can slowly build support by making a good
showing in the early primaries. The fact that the primaries will be
spread out over time will give voters a chance to think and assess
the various candidates. The primary season will not be over in a
day, at least if things go according to plan.
D. The Democratic “Change Commission” Proposal
The Democratic National Primary “Change Commission” (the
“Commission”) made three major recommendations for changing
the primary process.139 The first involved the timing of the prima140
ries. The Commission proposed moving the start date of the
primaries back to February (the earliest primaries would be held
no sooner than February 1) and to encourage states to cluster their
primaries in regions. They would do this, not by sanctioning those
states that cut ahead in line (as they tried, unsuccessfully, to do in
2008), but by offering “bonus” delegates and other inducements to

139.
140.

Report, supra note 5, at 17–21.
Id. at 17–18.
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states which opt to participate in a regional cluster.141 In other
words, the DNC has firmly sided with the idea of a regional primary, against the related trends of frontloading and a national
primary. However, the Commission did not recommend removing
the priority given to New Hampshire, Iowa, Nevada, and South
Carolina. They can have their primaries or caucuses in February.142
All other states must wait until the first Tuesday in March.
The second reform recommended by the Commission was to
remove the influence of unpledged delegates, or superdelegates.143
Concerned that superdelegates nearly had a decisive role in choosing the nominee in 2008, the Commission wanted the nominee to
144
reflect entirely the wishes of the voters in the states. All delegates,
the Commission said, should be assigned based on the result of
state primaries and caucuses: the party leaders would now be able
to attend the party either as “assigned delegates” or as non-voting
delegates.145 The effect of this reform would be to eliminate the
possibility that superdelegates could act as a meaningful counterweight on the nominee as determined by the popular vote.
The Commission’s final set of recommendations, regarding the
146
caucuses, were more tentative. The Commission expressed a concern about people being able to attend the caucuses, and about
haphazard organization on the part of many states. They did not
propose abolishing the caucus system, nor did they formally recommend against it. Rather, they counseled the adopting of a set of
“Best Practices” in order to guide states that use the caucus system.147
How do these reforms fare in light of the values articulated in
this paper? The move towards regional primaries, which the Commission recommends (and suggests a mechanism for
encouraging), gets high marks for promoting deliberation. The
idea of spreading out the primaries gives more time to consider
the candidates, and the regional emphasis may give the edge to less
141. Id. at 18.
142. These primaries and caucuses are referred to as “pre-window” events. Id.
143. Report, supra note 5, at 18–19.
144. See Michael O’Brien, DNC to Reform Primary System, Cutting Many ‘Superdelegates’, The
Hill’s Blog Briefing Room, (Mar. 23, 2009, 3:12 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blogbriefing-room/news/campaigns/37604-dnc-to-reform-primary-system-cutting-manysuperdelegates (noting desire of the Democratic National Committee to “put voters first”);
Tom Schaller, DCC Trying to Encourage Regional Primaries, FiveThirtyEight (Jan. 13, 2010,
3:42 PM), http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/01/dcc-trying-to-encourage-regional.html
(“The overwhelming view was that reforms needed to be made to ensure that the preferences of the voters was not overridden by unelected delegates . . . .”)
145. Report, supra note 5, at 19.
146. Cf. id. at 20–21.
147. Id. at 21.
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well-known candidates. So this should be considered to be on the
right track.
What of the other reforms? The demise of superdelegates—
something which now seems inevitable—should be looked at as a
mixed blessing. To be sure, the Commission is right that giving
superdelegates a vote risks not having the nominee be entirely a
matter of the popular vote. In a superdelegate system, candidates
will have to persuade both the people and the party regulars if they
want to be assured of the nomination. But was this entirely a bad
thing? The whole idea of superdelegates was to have them act as a
check on the popular favorite—to avoid a candidate who could
win, but who might not be successful at governing or in advancing
the party’s interests.148 Moreover, we might even think of the superdelegates as adding an additional voice to the deliberative process.
Candidates will have to engage not only the interests of the votersat-large, which might be focused on the short term, but also to the
party hierarchy, which has the party’s long term interests at heart.
The loss of superdelegates is not an unmitigated good. It is part of
a trend, which now seems inevitable, towards complete popular
control of the primaries.149 We might have reasons to lament that
trend.150
The Commission’s recommendation on caucuses reflected a decided ambivalence about their existence. Caucuses present
logistical problems that are absent from regular primaries.151 But
they nonetheless have an advantage on the deliberative front. Caucuses, at least in principle, require discussion and persuasion.
Minds can be changed during the caucus—a far cry from the private voting booth, where a simple preference is recorded. So the
logistical challenges may be worth it. But the battle to defend cau148. As Nelson Polsby famously said, “[p]eer review is a criterion which entails the mobilization within the party of a capacity to assess the qualities of candidates for public office
according to such dimensions as intelligence, sobriety of judgment, intellectual flexibility,
ability to work well with others, willingness to learn from experience, detailed personal
knowledge of government, and other personal characteristics which can best be revealed
through personal acquaintance.” Nelson W. Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform 169–70 (1983).
149. See Mann, in AEI Panel Discussion, supra note 22, at 25–26 (stating that “the tendency toward direct democracy is a substantial theme in our politics, in our culture”);
Ranney, supra note 30, at 13 (“Ever since the triumph of the Progressive movement . . . one
of the criteria by which Americans have most often judged their political institutions is that
of participation . . . .”); Wang, supra note 69, at 4 (“We now are in an era in which the consensus is that nominating contests should be broadly participatory, not exclusionary, and
reflective of the will of the rank and file.”).
150. I discuss this point more in the conclusion.
151. See supra Part II.A.1 (indicating difficulties with certain groups being able to participate in caucuses).
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cuses may ultimately be a losing one: in the face of the increasing
pressure for more direct democracy as well as the logistical problems that beset caucuses, the day of the caucus may soon be
coming to an end.
Conclusion
What do we want in a presidential primary? What should we
want? I have not tried to give a definitive answer to these questions,
although I have indicated my sympathy for certain reforms of the
process in light of the meta-value of deliberation. Rather, my main
aim has been to give us a framework, or more precisely a set of values, that we can use in analyzing our current primary process as
well as proposals for reforming that process. These values are taken
from the field of election law, which has, over the past two decades,
emerged as a vital and dynamic area of legal scholarship. Election
law’s contribution to the debate over primaries, I have argued, is to
isolate certain entities and certain values as having a constitutional
significance. Individual voters have the right to vote considered
along many dimensions: they have the right to participate, the
right to an effective vote, and the right to a meaningful vote. Political parties have interests in maintaining both their autonomy and
their ideological purity: two values which are sometimes at odds
with one another. State and federal governments have interests in
ensuring that elections are legitimate and corruption free, that
they are competitive, and that they result in electing someone who
can actually govern. If we examine these values, we can find them
all in play—to greater and lesser degrees—in the presidential primaries. This is what I hope to have shown in Part II.
Election law also suggests a deeper value which might unite the
various interests and players in the process. That value is deliberation. I highlighted the significance of that value in evaluating
proposals for reforming the primary process in Part III.
But in addition to providing an analytical framework to use in
understanding and evaluating the presidential primary system, I
hope to have set the stage for a deeper questioning of what presidential primaries are for, especially as compared to the general
presidential election contest. Are the same values as relevant in the
presidential primary as they are in the general election for president?152 I have suggested that deliberation should be given a
152. See Greenberg, supra note 5, at 36 (stating that parties are not obliged to “hew to
an ideal of more direct democracy that we aspire to follow in electing public officials”);
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greater and more important role in the primaries than in the general election. To use the language of Part III, it may be more
important to aggregate votes—to make sure everyone can have
their preference recorded—in the general election. But this may
leave it open for the presidential primaries to be less concerned
about recording preferences than in encouraging deliberation
among citizens. Perhaps we should be less worried about giving
everyone an equally effective vote in the primaries (something a
national primary would ensure) and more about making sure that
the process does a good job of testing candidates and sparking a
national conversation about their merits. From this angle, it may
be less important that one’s state or region be decisive in picking a
candidate (i.e., that one has an “effective vote”) and more important that there is a competitive campaign and a diverse group
of candidates. There are many ways to participate in the political
process other than simply casting a ballot. Ironically, those elements of the primary system that are most disdained—the
preference to Iowa and New Hampshire, caucuses, superdelegates,
and conventions—may have the greatest potential to enhance deliberation. In thinking about how to reform the primaries, we
should not be so quick to overlook those things that actually preserve deliberation in the status quo and which we might want to
keep. Thus, we might want to resist the trend of more states having
their primaries on the same day, as well as the move to eliminate or
reduce the power of superdelegates.
If we look at deliberation as the “master value” we should seek to
promote in the primaries, then the answer we give to my title question—what do we want in a presidential primary?—may be very
different than the answer to the question, what do we want in a
general election? The tendency in both the law and in the study of
it has been to assimilate the primary process to the general election process. Both involve the same players and the same interests,
so it is only natural to assume that they should emphasize the same
values. And indeed, when it comes to fundamental rights, such as
the right to cast a ballot, it is unquestionable that they should share
the same values. But beyond this, perhaps we should question
whether all values should be considered the same in the primaries
and in the general elections. In particular, we should be open to
ways in which the primaries might become more deliberative, even

Hasen, supra note 69 (noting different Constitutional standards for primary and general
elections).
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if they are not directly “democratic.”153 The trend now, at least in
fact if not in law, is for the primaries to resemble the general election: to make securing the nomination a single-shot, national, and
popular affair. If we care about deliberation, we should resist this
trend.

153. Cf. Ceaser et al., supra note 5, at 121–22 (calling superdelegates and caucuses the
“least democratic” aspects of the primary campaign).

